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Abstract 
Decentralisation promises efficiency gain and improved access to public goods and services, especially at 
the local level. Under decentralised governance arrangement, regional and environmental peculiarities are 
given prominent consideration in delivering public goods and services. Given the impact of the environment 
in influencing sanitation and water services, particularly water provision, this study examines the effect of 
decentralisation, as measured by revenue share and expenditure share, on improved access to sanitation 
and water services. Exploiting the variation in improved access to sanitation facilities and water sources 
using a static panel data estimator, this study’s empirical results suggest a positive impact of 
decentralisation on the improved access to sanitation and water services. The positive effect is larger in 
rural areas vis-à-vis the country level and urban areas. The study reveals that wealth and institutional factors 
are also important to improve access to sanitation and water services. 
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The United Nations (UN) agencies such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) started data collection on drinking water and sanitation in 1990. In 1990, 77 
percent of the world had access to drinkable water from improved sources, but only 54 percent had access 
to improved sanitation facilities (WHO, 2008). Since that year, the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring 
Programme (JMP) had been in place to monitor and keep data on countries’ progress in meeting                                                        
drinking water supply and availability of sanitation facilities. Predominantly in the 1990s, lack of drinking 
water and inadequate sanitation facilities were global challenges. The trend in the data reported from many 
countries might have informed the inclusion of access to drinkable water and sanitation facilities among the 
targets of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
In 2000, Member States of the UN approved the Millennium Declaration, which was translated into eight 
MDGs. This was to bring an end to poverty in all its ramifications, including lack of access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation facilities. Under the MDGs program, the targets for water and sanitation were measured 
in terms of the population’s proportion using improved sources of drinking water and the proportion of the 
population having access to improved sanitation facilities, respectively. According to the UN (WHO/UNICEF, 
2015), the improved drinking water sources include piped water, protected wells, and other suitable drinking 
water sources. Improved sanitation facilities are sanitation facilities that guarantee the hygienic separation 
of human excreta from human contact. At the time of winding up the MDGs program in 2015 to be 
supplanted with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) starting from 2016, the UN declares in her MDGs 
report that 147 countries have met drinking water target, 95 countries have met the sanitation target, and 
77 countries have met both globally. Still, many people around the world are without access to drinkable 
water and improved sanitation facilities. Around the world, 2.1 billion people are without potable water at 
home, while 4.5 billion people do not have access to toilets at home for safe disposal of excreta 
(WHO/UNICEF, 2015). The inability to eradicate problems of poor sanitation and lack of drinking water has 
inevitably made the inclusion of water and sanitation, including improved hygiene that was not part of the 
MDGs, as goal number 6 in the SDGs program that encompasses 17 goals. The SDGs program aims to go 
beyond MDGs’ achievements on poverty and hunger in all ramifications by 2030 (WHO/UNICEF, 2017).  
The global efforts to eradicate poor sanitation and lack of drinking water is not unconnected with their 
significant knock-on effects on the economy. Many people die worldwide due to causes directly linked to 
poor sanitation and lack of drinkable water. According to WHO (2008), half of the child malnutrition is 
directly linked to unsafe water, inadequate sanitation facilities, and poor hygiene. It has also been 
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established that the loss of productivity arising from water and sanitation-related infections results in about 
5 percent loss in many countries’ GDP, especially in developing countries (WHO, 2012). Considering these 
vast economic losses, UN agencies are encouraging nations to avoid these losses by investing in drinking 
water and sanitation services. They are also mobilising funds from donors to assist needy nations in meeting 
the cost of investments in water and sanitation services. WHO (2012) reports that every $1 invested in water 
and sanitation-related services brings a return of about $4 in productivity gain. Despite the apparent benefits, 
many nations cannot meet the enormous investment required for water and sanitation provision. The gap 
in meeting these essential services globally under the WASH (Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene) targets of 
SDGs 6 has been put at $1.7 trillion (Hutton & Varughese, 2016). 
The gloomy situation of water and sanitation services around the globe has motivated this work. Most of the 
areas that are less served in many countries are located outside the urban areas. In response to this, we 
set to examine if the problems can be tackled through the governance architecture of decentralisation. 
Environmental factors significantly affect these services, and subnational governments are best positioned 
to address the issues. Besides, we observe that location-specific studies have been conducted on water and 
sanitation in the context of decentralisation (Lary-Adjei & van Dijk, 2012; Asthana, 2003; Oates, 2002; 
Dinan, Cropper & Portney, 1999). However, despite the problems posed by the lack of water and sanitation 
services globally, there is a dearth of cross-country studies conducted on the impact of decentralised 
governance architecture on sanitation and water services. Therefore, this study is an attempt to fill this gap. 
Additionally, political competition can affect service delivery in a country (Arvate, 2013). The study tries to 
discern the impact of political competition on the outcome of interest through the interaction of political 
competition with measures of decentralisation. The study finds that decentralisation leads to improve access 
to sanitation facilities and water sources. The effect is larger in rural areas vis-à-vis the country level and 
urban areas. The level of wealth and institutions are crucial contributory factors in the provision of the 
services. However, the effect of political competition on improved access to sanitation facilities and water 
sources through interaction terms is not identifiable.  
The organisation of the study is structured as follows. Section two discusses the concept of decentralisation 
and its measurement, including relevant literature to the study. Section three provides information on 
methodology and data, econometric strategy, and estimation issues. While in section four, the results of the 




2. Literature review 
2.1 Decentralisation: conceptual and measurement issues 
Decentralisation describes the process of transferring fiscal powers from the central government to 
subnational governments to increase the provision of public outputs and tailor such outputs to local needs. 
This definition is limited to the fiscal perspective of decentralisation. There are political and administrative 
views of decentralisation. The state’s constitutional structure addresses the political view of decentralisation; 
a state is considered decentralised when it operates a federal constitution. Also, the process of the 
emergence of local officials is factored into the political definition of decentralisation. From the 
administrative perspective, the power of the lower levels of government determines administrative 
decentralisation (Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Penãs & Sacchi, 2017). The capacity of subnational governments 
in making fiscal decisions independent of the central government is important. By and large, 
decentralisation, the transfer of power to local people to run their governments and provide their public 
goods, is an instrument being employed to improve the public sector’s performance (Oates, 1972, 1999).1 
Decentralisation is a means to accelerate development, especially in developing nations (Smoke, Loffler & 
Bossi, 2013). Based on economies of scale, which arises from externalities/spillovers and factors mobility 
across jurisdictions, central planning may be preferred to decentralisation as the central government may 
be able to adequately internalise the effects of economic activities (Veiga et al., 2015). Based on information 
asymmetry and costs and benefits,2 it appears more reasonable to allow for local provision of public services. 
However, issues of information and costs and benefits may appear stronger in some cases, which may 
justify the local provision of public goods and the need for decentralisation.3  
Decentralisation assumes a different meaning in economics as compared with political science. The term 
does not depend on the constitutional structure; though, the constitution expressly specifies the power and 
autonomy of various levels of government in a federation.4 The extent of the power exercised by lower tiers 
of government varies from country to country in both federal and unitary states and may change in either 
direction over time. A federal state by the constitution (e.g., Nigeria) may be less decentralised than a 
nominally unitary state (e.g., the United Kingdom). By and large, in economics, all public sectors are more 
 
1 The literature on multilevel government recognises three types of decentralisation, regardless of the state’s constitutional structure: deconcentration, delegation, 
and devolution, from the weakest to the strongest. All forms of decentralisation involve the transfers of fiscal power and authority over certain functions to 
subnational governments. However, the power to act without recourse to the central government varies under each form of decentralisation (see Blume & Voigt 
(2011) for some details).  
2 This may depend on the nature of goods and/or services being produced. 
3 From a functional perspective, social protection is the least decentralised function, while subnational governments play significant roles in services such as 
health, education, housing, and environmental protection (Veiga et al., 2015).  
4 Decentralisation is not a one-size fit all affair. There is great diversity in this issue. Gómez-Reino and Martinez-Vazquez (2013) report in a study involving a 
sample of 197 countries that 101 countries have two levels of government, 50 countries have three levels of government, 35 countries have one, and 10 countries 
have 4 tiers of government. Two extreme cases feature in the study: Kiribati has no local government, while India has more than 240,000 local governments. 
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or less decentralised as different levels of government are in charge of the production of various public 
goods and services with different levels of authority (Oates, 1972, 1999). Governments at various levels 
exercise some fiscal authority over their jurisdictions for multiple government levels to perform their duties. 
These include the power to tax and raise funds through borrowing. Tax-assignment addresses the issue of 
the vertical fiscal imbalance in revenue allocation in a federation. Issues of capacity, cost, and efficiency 
are factors in assigning tax functions to various tiers of government. The central government is usually 
empowered to raise certain taxes because of the economy and efficiency of doing so at the central level. 
This leaves the central government with a large share of revenues from taxes. Hence, the need for the 
central government to make intergovernmental grants to lower tiers of government. Also, the horizontal fiscal 
imbalance at subnational levels in terms of revenue-generating capacity and the need for functions at 
subnational units to be efficiently and effectively performed requires transfers to be made to them.  
Decentralisation may be measured in different ways, depending on the definition and perspective. It is 
measured using fiscal decentralisation indicators such as ratios of subnational-centre revenues, subnational-
centre expenditures, and vertical imbalance. Decentralisation is also measured using political 
decentralisation indicators such as local elections and political divisions and structural and administrative 
decentralisation indicators (Martinez-Vazquez & Timofeev, 2010; Blume & Voigt, 2011; Dzobek, Mangas & 
Kufa, 2011; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017). These indicators are measured in several ways. According to 
Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2017 p. 1098), “no single measure of decentralisation can capture all the multiple 
dimensions that decentralisation offers.” Notwithstanding the shortcomings of any of these measures, this 
study will use the fiscal decentralisation indicators in econometric estimation. 
Specifically, the ratio of revenues of subnational governments to total government revenues (revenue share) 
and the ratio of expenditures of subnational governments to total government expenditures (expenditure 
share) will be used in this study as measures of decentralisation. These are constructed from the IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS). There are measurement issues with these measures of 
decentralisation.5 Even so, these measures of decentralisation constructed from the GFS data are widely 
used in empirical studies. The major problem with these measures is the aggregation of data in the GFS. 
Information at the subnational level is aggregated, making it difficult to account for heterogeneity between 
tiers and within tiers of government under decentralisation. Also, there is no known measure to account for 
the efficiency of government funds at any of the tiers of government. The reportage of data varies across 
 
5 There are attempts at developing other measures. These are also not without their challenges. See Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2017 p. 1098-1099) for a recent 
discussion of these issues.  
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countries and regions. Developed economies report more data than developing economies. This introduces 
a selection bias into the information. 
 
2.2 The impact of decentralisation in other government policy areas 
Decentralisation helps to accelerate development, tailor public outputs towards local needs, and bring 
government closer to the governed (Oates, 1999). The effects of decentralisation in many other policy areas 
have been studied. These policy areas include health, education, governance, growth, poverty, and 
inequality, to mention but a few. On a general note, the result is mixed for the effect of decentralisation on 
growth (Davoodi & Zou, 1998; Thiessen, 2003; Thornton, 2007; Rodríguez-Rose & Ezcurra, 2011; Gemmell 
et al., 2013). Both studies by Sepulveda and Martinez-Vasquez (2011) and Sacchi and Saloti (2014) fail to 
establish that decentralisation reduces poverty and inequality. However, studies have established that 
decentralisation produces positive impacts in the service areas, especially in providing health services and 
education. Fiscal decentralisation improves life expectancy and other health outcomes and reduces infant 
mortality rates (Cantarero & Pascual, 2008; Rubio, 2011; Soto et al., 2012; Faguet & SánChez, 2014). 
Though, Brock et al. (2015) establish that decentralisation does not reduce infant mortality in China.  
The effect of fiscal decentralisation is positive on education and educational outcomes (Barankay & 
Lockwood, 2007; Falch & Fisher, 2012; Diaz-Serrano & Meix-Llop, 2012; Faguet & SánChez, 2014). 
Additionally, decentralisation has also been found to be of crucial importance in improving governance. 
Fiscal decentralisation increases the quality of governance (Kyriacon & Rosa-Segalés, 2011), reduces both 
transnational and domestic terror attacks (Drucker & Fisher, 2010, 2011), and correlates positively with 
trust in government (Lightart & Oudheusden, 2015). Under an ideal decentralised system, substantial 
resources are devolved to the local government. Where this happens, fiscal decentralisation should improve 
governance outcomes. On the dark side of decentralisation, Reinikka and Svensson (2004) posit that 
decentralisation may bring about local capture. This occurs when resources transfer to subnational 
governments for developmental purposes are cornered by the local elites for their narrow interests 
(Prud’homme, 1995). Excessive fragmentation resulting from decentralisation sometimes leads to loss of 
economies of scale in producing goods and services. These undesirable outcomes of decentralisation may 
have informed the position of Ahmad et al. (2006) that the process of implementing decentralisation can 




2.3 Sanitation and water services: A survey 
Water and sanitation services are essential in reducing morbidity and in improving health, welfare, and 
development. Koola and Zwane (2014 p. 477) posit that “improving health and mitigating diarrheal 
morbidity is the underlying rationale for water and sanitation.” Alsan and Goldin (2019), using historical 
data of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conclude that the combination of sewerage and 
safe water treatment lowers under-five child mortality in Massachusetts, United States of America (US). This 
finding is similar to the result obtained by Jaadla and Puur (2016) for Tartu, Estonia. Gamper-Rabindran at 
al. (2010) find that provision of piped water reduces under-1 infant mortality in Brazil. This occurs through 
improvement in the water supply, which raises the level of wellness of infants. Fiscal decentralisation is 
associated with lower infant mortality rates (Asfaw et al., 2007; Robalino, Picazo & Voetberg, 2001), which 
may be attributed to the role of subnational governments in the provision of sanitation and water services.  
The level of political competition can influence the responsiveness of the government at any administrative 
level. Provision of public services, including water and sewerage services, has been found to respond to 
electoral competition at the local level in Mexico, particularly in Jalisco and Michoaćan (Hiskey, 2000) and 
Brazil (Arvate, 2013). Cleary (2007) concludes that electoral competition does not impact the municipal 
government performance, but measures of electoral participation cause improved performance in terms of 
the provision of public goods. The study suggests that municipalities with higher electoral participation by 
the citizens do better in providing services by connecting more houses with sewerage, and provision of 
potable water.  However, Rosenzweige (2015) finds evidence that electoral competition improves public 
service provision, including pipe-borne water in Tanzania. Granados and Sánchez (2014) observe that 
improvement in water and sanitation services is associated with a reduction in child mortality where 
municipalities directly provide the services in Colombia, in contrast to municipalities that engage private 
companies. They recommend the direct provision of water and sanitation services by municipalities because 
the political interest of remaining in the office encourages political officeholders to provide better services. 
Zewari et al. (2011) argue that states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) make a poor investment 
in water and sanitation facilities, thereby failing to provide the services where they are most needed, 
especially in informal settlements. Besides, they observe that centralisation of water and sanitation 
infrastructures contribute to the poor quality of services provided, while some areas are denied access to 
services.  
Veiga et al. (2015) posit that decentralisation is emerging as a preferred governance architecture in providing 
essential services such as water and sewerage services. The central goal of decentralisation is the exercise 
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of political power by local actors over what and how goods and services are produced at the local 
government. Indeed, the idea behind decentralisation is that local governments can improve welfare and 
development when resources of various jurisdictions are appropriately matched with their needs (Oates, 
1972, 1999). On the arsenic rule standard in drinking water in the US, Oates (2002) argues that the 
standard should suit each district’s circumstances. This was in response to the centralised standard set by 
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The implication of this is that provision of water and 
sanitation services should be decentralised given the impact of natural/environmental factors in delivering 
these services. In effect, decentralisation of water and sanitation services will improve the coverage of the 
services because drinking water availability and quality are highly susceptible to environmental quality and 
standards.  
Dinan et al. (1999) argue that the imposition of a uniform standard in a federal state without consideration 
for each locality’s cost-benefit criterion results in inefficiency and welfare losses in water provision. The view 
is supported by Chattopadhyay’s (2012) submission that the central planning process leads to inadequate 
provision of public goods and low quality of life. Ranganathan et al. (2009) submit that decentralised water 
and sanitation services are adopted in Indian cities to fill the gap in these essential services. Laryea-Adjei 
and van Dijk (2012) conclude that decentralisation leads to improved water and sanitation services in 
Ghana. Awuah et al. (2009) observe that decentralisation aids the provision of services in Temale and 
Savelugu-Nanto. Faguet and Sánchez (2014) note that decentralisation in Colombia improves access of the 
poor to water and sanitation services under public health facilities. 
Montgomery and Elimelech (2007) argue in favour of a decentralised approach in the provision of water 
and sanitation services for developing countries. They note that the implementation of large and centralised 
treatments is expensive and problematic in terms of maintenance. At the heart of this is the issue of 
efficiency in asset utilisation. The persistent water scarcity spurs decentralised management of river basin 
water resources (Dinar at al., 2007). This, in many cases, leads to improved water provision. Availability of 
water and adequate provision of sanitation facilities have significant knock-on effects on the economy. With 
decentralisation, these services can be made available at every subnational unit in any geopolitical space, 
and all the benefits of the availability can be internalised. It guarantees efficiency in infrastructural 
investment, distribution, and costs. Though Asthana (2003) finds that the efficiency of water utilities in 
expense and asset utilisation in Central India is poor, this should not be the basis of rejection of 
decentralisation as a governance strategy in alleviating the problems of poor sanitation and water scarcity 
around the world. The environmental standard and quality of water are not the same across the studied 
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areas. Thus, financial/operating efficiency cannot be the only basis for measuring the gain of 
decentralisation. The level of a contaminant in each decentralised unit will impact operating efficiency and 
profitability. This will also result in welfare losses if not sufficiently factored into the service that Asthana’s 
(2003) study did not adequately consider. Herrera (2014) argues that the simultaneous implementation of 
market policies with decentralisation will harm decentralisation of sanitation and water services in Mexico. 
Herrera’s (2014) conclusion negates the market efficiency criterion of Asthana (2003). 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 The empirical model 
The model in equation (1) has been specified to investigate the relationship between decentralisation and 
water and sanitation services. A similar model has been used in a study by Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2011) to study the impact of decentralisation on poverty and income inequality.  
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑀𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜌𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡−1+ 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡                                                                                        (1)   
 
where 𝑖 indexes a country and 𝑡 represents a year. The parameters of interest to be estimated in equation 
(1) are β, ρ, ψ, and γ. 𝛼𝑖 is the individual effect of country 𝑖, it becomes 𝛼, homogenous intercept term 
for each country 𝑖 when the model is estimated using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS); while, 𝜉𝑖𝑡is the 
error term. In equation (1), the dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents two variables, sanitation facilities and 
water sources. In the first case, the dependent variable is the percentage of the total population with 
improved access to sanitation facilities for a country in a particular year. In the second case, the dependent 
variable is the percentage of the total population with improved access to water sources for a country in a 
particular year. MFD implies measures of fiscal decentralisation in a one-year lag. Two measures of 
decentralisation are considered in this study: Revenue share is the ratio of revenues of subnational 
governments to total government revenues, and Expenditure share is the ratio of expenditures of subnational 
governments to total government expenditures. Since the decentralisation policy may not have a 
contemporaneous effect on the improved access to sanitation and water services because of policy lag, a 
one-year lag of the decentralisation variable is introduced. Each of the dependent variables is regressed on 
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measures of decentralisation, along with other covariates. If decentralisation improves access to sanitation 
and water services, the a priori expectation of the sign associated with the decentralisation variables is 
positive in the model.  
The responsiveness of government is linked to political competition (Hisky, 2000; Arvate, 2013; Rosenweig, 
2015). A way of testing the government’s responsiveness in this study is through the interaction of a dummy 
variable for political competition with measures of decentralisation. The dummy, Political competition, is 
generated from “Polity2” in Polity IV data.6 The dummy variable is based on the work of Aidt and Eterovic 
(2011). In this study, the “Polity2” score for a country in a particular year is normalised to 1 for a less 
politically competitive country that scores between -10 and 0; otherwise, a country is assigned a dummy of 
0. The a priori expectation for the sign of the dummy variable’s coefficient is negative because the non-
politically competitive countries will care less about the people’s welfare. Also, we interact the dummy with 
the MFD. The interaction term makes the impact of decentralisation on sanitation and water services 
dependent on the level of Political competition. Thus, it measures the partial effect of MFD when Political 
competition is 1. It explains the impact of decentralisation on sanitation and water services in states that 
are less politically competitive. The impact of decentralisation on sanitation and water services for less 
politically competitive countries will be determined by the joint coefficients of decentralisation as measured 
by either Revenue share or Expenditure share with the coefficient of the interaction term. However, the 
expected sign for the coefficient associated with the interaction term is not definite. This stems from 
implications of the political environment on decentralisation arrangement for measures of decentralisation.  
Other covariates in the model are Government size, Log GDP per capita, Log population density, 
Bureaucratic quality, Democratic accountability, Globalisation, and Internal conflict. The size of government 
is constructed from the WDI as a proportion of the general government final consumption expenditure to 
gross domestic product (GDP).7 This variable is important in explaining the production of public goods and 
services, namely water and sanitation. Thus, the expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is positive. 
The Log GDP per capita is the log of GDP per person in a nation in constant term. This is a measure of the 
level of development and the welfare level in any economy. It also represents the average income per person 
in a year. This is expected to be positively related to improved access to sanitation and water services. The 
richer a country is, the higher is the likelihood that essential services such as sanitation and water services 
are adequately provided to the entire population. The expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is 
positive. The Log population density is the log of the ratio of the total population to land area (in square 
 
6 See Centre for Systemic Peace, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.  
7 Both general government final consumption expenditure and GDP are in 2010 US$ constant term. 
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kilometre) of a country. The population density may drive the provision of essential services such as 
sanitation and water services. A high population density indicates pressure on public facilities, which 
requires the government to make more investment in basic services to meet the population’s needs. Thus, 
the expected sign of the coefficient of this variable is positive.  
Bureaucratic quality is a measure of institutional quality in a country. It is an indicator of the stability of 
bureaucracy. It denotes the risk of policy reversal in a country, often caused by political pressure on public 
service officers. A high-quality public service that ensures smoothness in government operations is an asset 
to any nation as public service officers implement and monitor public projects. The data is obtained from 
ICRG, and the score for this variable ranges from 0 to 4. The high-risk countries with poor bureaucratic 
quality are scored 4. In contrast, the low-risk countries that have their public services insulated from political 
pressure are scored 0. Thus, it is expected that Bureaucratic quality and provision of services are negatively 
correlated. Democratic accountability spurs the provision of public goods and services. It is also an 
institutional factor; the data is obtained from ICRG with a score ranging from 1 to 6. It measures government 
responsiveness to its people under different democratic practices from alternating democracy to autarchy. 
It is also a measure of the risk of collapse of a government. Countries with the lowest risk of government 
collapse receive the highest score of 6, while high-risk countries receive the lowest score of 1. This variable 
is expected to be positively correlated with improved access to sanitation and water services. 
Globalisation is a composite measure of the economic, political, and social aspects of globalisation. It is an 
indicator of how countries are opened to global influence. Because of the information globalisation, events 
in a country are not independent of events in another country. As people share information about their 
development, it is expected that this will impact the provision of services in another country. Indeed, the 
influence of globalisation may have motivated the UN MDGs (and now SGDs) to ensure a certain minimum 
standard of public services across the globe. This may have necessitated the monitoring of the provision of 
sanitation and water services. Thus, this variable is expected to be positively correlated with improved access 
to sanitation facilities and water sources. Internal conflict is a measure of internal strife’s risk and its impact 
on governance with subcomponent issues of civil war and coup threat, terrorism and political violence, and 
civil disorder. The absence of peace is a significant threat to governance, which eliminates all possibilities 
for development. Thus, no improvement in access to sanitation and water is possible in the absence of 
peace. According to the definition of ICRG, a high-risk country is scored 0, while a low-risk country is scored 
4. It is expected that this will negatively correlate with the improved provision of sanitation and water services 




This study’s data is panel data covering a period of twenty-four years from the year 1991 to the year 2014. 
This covers a long period over which the UN MDGs are vigorously pursued to reduce the problems of lack 
of drinkable water and poor sanitation facilities worldwide. Though data on improved access to drinkable 
water and sanitation is available for almost all the world countries, the sample size for this study is reduced 
to 68 because some countries did not report any data in GFS. Many of the countries in the sample are high-
income countries.8 These countries had attained considerable access to drinkable water and sanitation 
facilities when the data collection started. Notwithstanding, they stepped up the provision of these services 
to attained full coverage in their countries. The data on improved access to sanitation and water is from the 
UN database reported in World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). Like the GFS data, the UN data on 
sanitation and water services is vitiated by aggregation and lack of quality definition. While it gives the picture 
at the national level, it does not reveal households and communities’ situation. Though the data is 
disaggregated to provide information on the rural and urban areas, the information remains aggregated over 
these units. Additionally, there is a claim that the figures are overstated and do not represent the actual 
situation (Zawahri et al., 2011). The summary statistics of the data is displayed in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics, 1991 - 2014 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Improved access to sanitation, country level 88.54 16.76 16.90 100 
Improved access to sanitation, urban areas 92.05 11.59 43.00 100 
Improved access to sanitation, rural areas 82.73 23.51 5.60 100 
Improved access to water, country level 95.34 7.19 60.90 100 
Improved access to water, urban areas 98.20 3.60 67.50 100 
Improved access to water, rural areas 90.47 13.51 41.90 100 
Revenue share 26.64 14.53 0.82 85.43 
Expenditure share 24.29 14.28 1.81 76.61 
Government size 18.71 5.07 6.83 37.74 
Log GDP per capita 9.53 1.17 6.32 11.61 
Log population density 4.14 1.23 0.50 6.24 
Bureaucratic quality 2.89 1.04 0.00 4.00 
Democratic accountability 5.02 1.26 1.00 6.00 
Globalisation index 71.65 14.51 31.08 92.84 
Internal conflict 10.01 1.64 2.33 12.00 
Political competition 0.07 
 
0 1.00 
Notes: The data is sourced from UN, IMF, ICRG, WBI, Polity IV, and KOF index of globalisation. The Log GDP per capita is the log of Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (GDP). Log pop. density refers to log population density. Democratic acct. means democratic accountability. N=1050. N is the number of observations for 
each variable for all countries. Source: Author’s computation. 
 
8 This classification is based on the World Bank classification for the year 2016 using the 2014 data. 
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3.3 Econometric issues and specification tests 
Given the longitudinal dimension of the data for this study, three estimators are employed in the econometric 
estimation of equation (1). These estimators are pooled ordinary least squares estimator (OLS), fixed effects 
estimator (FE), and random effects estimator (RE). A series of specification and diagnostic tests are 
conducted to check for issues that may negatively affect the parameter estimates’ consistency and efficiency 
for this study. Correlation analysis of the variables obtained from the correlation matrix indicates that Log 
GDP per capita and Globalisation are highly and positively correlated in the region of 0.87. All correlation 
coefficients for other variables are below 0.87.  
Two tests are employed to check for the existence of the problem of heteroskedasticity in the data. The 
study exploits White’s (White, 1980) test for heteroskedasticity. This test is robust to heteroscedasticity with 
errors that are not normally distributed and variances that are not linear. The test suggests a rejection of 
the null of homoskedasticity for all the models with Revenue share and Expenditure share among the 
regressors. Additionally, the modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity (Greene, 2017) is employed 
to investigate the heteroscedasticity problem in the data further. The null of homoskedasticity is rejected for 
all the models. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (Drucker, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010) is 
employed to test for the problem of autocorrelation in the data. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation 
is rejected for all the models. These identified problems can impact the efficiency and consistency of the 
regression estimates of this study. A clustered robust standard error at the country level is reported for all 
the regression estimates. The clustered robust standard errors are robust to the problems of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within a country but not across countries.  
 
4. Empirical strategy and results 
OLS is consistent and unbiased if there is no endogeneity problem or no covariance between regressors 
and the error term. If no covariance condition is satisfied, it provides the response variable’s effect on the 
unconditional population mean of the independent variable based on the law of iterated expectation. Two 
problems plague OLS: common intercept term for all the countries and the requirement that regressors and 
the error term are contemporaneously uncorrelated, which is always violated due to the country-specific 
error’s autocorrelation. It will be incorrect to assume that the coverage level achieved in the provision of 
services in the current period is independent of previous periods. Therefore, a strategy to correct 
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autocorrelation is implemented in OLS by obtaining clustered robust standard errors for efficient and 
consistent estimates.  
The FE estimator helps control for the unobserved individual country-specific effects, which could have 
resulted in omitted variables in a panel data regression. The individual country-effect may vary over countries 
and a major improvement over OLS. The FE estimator can capture observable and unobservable country-
specific and time-invariant differences. The FE estimator requires that there is no correlation between 
independent variables and the within-entity error term. The expected value of the deviation from the mean 
of the regressors and the error term is zero. This subsumes the exogeneity condition requires that the 
regressors’ current, future, and past values do not depend on the error term. This condition is necessary 
for an unbiased estimate of the individual effects (fixed effects) under this estimator. The RE estimator is 
more efficient than both OLS and FE in combining matrix weighted information from both within and 
between variances of the data. The central assumption under the RE estimator is the independence of the 
regressors and the composite error term. That is, the regressors are not correlated with both country-specific 
and remainder errors in this model. The conditions must also be fulfilled to ensure that the least square 
estimates of the coefficients are unbiased and consistent. However, the standard errors of the least square 
estimator are wrong. A more efficient estimate of the standard errors can be obtained from the (feasible) 
generalised least squares (GLS) estimator by exploiting the structure of the variance-covariance matrix of 
the error term (Verbeek, 2017). This requires that the regressors are not correlated with the individual and 
the remainder components, which is most times unrealistic.  
With the aid of the Breusch-Pagan (Breusch & Pegan, 1980) Lagrangian Multiplier (BP LM) test, an efficient 
estimator can be chosen between OLS and RE estimators. The test’s null hypothesis is that the variance 
across units is zero, which implies OLS is efficient. As reported in the main regression results in Table 2, 
under Revenue share and Expenditure share, the null of no variance across countries is rejected with Chi-
squared statistics of 6167.78 and 6200.32, respectively, at 1 percent level of significance. Also, in Table 3, 
for Revenue share and Expenditure share, the null of no variance across countries is rejected with Chi-
squared statistics of 2964.34 and 2943.75, respectively, at 1 percent level of significance. This indicates 
that OLS is not efficient. The Hausman test (1978) can be used to select between the RE and FE estimators. 
This test is distributed as Chi-squared. The null hypothesis is that the error term’s individual component is 
not correlated with the regressors, in which case FE will be efficient under the null and alternative 
hypotheses. On the other hand, RE will only be efficient under the null hypothesis. A large difference between 
the two estimators suggests that the RE estimator is not consistent. From the main regression results in 
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Table 2, under Revenue share and Expenditure share, we reject the null of no correlation between the 
individual error and regressors with Chi-squared statistics of 83.40 and 83.56, respectively, at 1 percent 
level of significance. Also, in Table 3, under Revenue share and Expenditure share, we reject the null of no 
correlation between the individual error and regressors with Chi-squared statistics of 50.54 and 44.27, 
respectively, at 1 percent level of significance. Thus, the discussion of our results will focus on the FE model. 
 
4.1 Results 
The results are displayed in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 displays the results of the effect of decentralisation as 
measured by revenue share and expenditure share on improved access to sanitation facilities. The results 
in columns 1 to 3 of Table 2 report the effect of decentralisation as measured by the revenue share on 
improved access to sanitation services. In contrast, the results in columns 4 to 6 report the effect of 
decentralisation as measured by the expenditure share on improved access to sanitation facilities. The focus 
will be on the FE model. FE is the most efficient estimator, which has the merit of exploiting within-country 
variation and reducing the problem of omitted variable bias. Besides, FE has the lowest root mean square 
error (RMSE), which indicates that the estimator is more efficient. This is confirmed with the Rho of 1.00, 
which implies that almost 100 percent of the variation is due to panel effects. The result in column 2, Table 
2 suggests that decentralisation, as measured by revenue share, does improve access to sanitation facilities. 
Lag revenue share is positive and statistically significant as expected. The result from FE suggests that a 1 
percentage point increase in decentralisation leads to an improvement of 0.12 percentage points in access 
to sanitation services. This implies that an increase in revenues of subnational governments in total 
government revenues may go into sanitation facilities. The coefficient from OLS is negative, -0.2811. This 
may be attributed to the non-usage of country-specific effects in the OLS model. Besides, the RE model’s 
coefficient (0.1064) is close to that of the FE model (0.1165), probably because of our large T. This is a 
pointer that sticking to the FE model in this study is not inappropriate as FE correctly estimates the model. 
One major determinant of public outputs is the level of wealth and the average income of any nation. The 
Log GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant. A 1 percentage increase in income level per capita 
leads to an increase of 0.10 percentage points in improved access to sanitation services. This suggests that 
improved access to sanitation facilities will be high in high-income countries. Given the public investment 
required to improve access to sanitation facilities, this study’s data speaks to the situation in many high-
income countries, as they have achieved a high level of coverage in improved access to sanitation services. 
Government size is also positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the size of government is 
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positively correlated with improved access to sanitation facilities. This indicates that the large government 
expenditures may be due to spending on the basic public outputs. The variable Log population density is 
another driver of the provision of sanitation services. The provision of sanitation services responds to the 
population density growth according to the a priori expectation.  
Though the level of wealth is considered crucial for public outputs, institutional factors may be as important 
as wealth level. Public institutions’ quality and stability are essential in raising the level of welfare and the 
availability and quality of public services. Democratic accountability is a major institutional factor that 
indicates the responsiveness of government. The variable is positive and statistically significant. A responsive 
government will provide essential public goods and services to the people in the right quantity and quality. 
The coefficient of Democratic accountability from all the estimators further lends credence to the efficiency 
of FE. The coefficient is negative under OLS, while the coefficient of RE is closed to that of FE. All other 
variables: Bureaucratic quality, Globalisation, Political competition, Internal conflict, and the interaction 
term, are not statistically significant.  
The result in column 5 of Table 2 describes the positive relationship between decentralisation as measured 
by expenditure share and improved access to sanitation facilities. The Lag expenditure share is positive and 
statistically significant. This suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in expenditures of subnational 
governments in total government expenditures leads to a rise of 0.11 percentage points in improved access 
to sanitation. Besides, Globalisation also explains improved access to sanitation services. This is a significant 
driver of the MDGs. The coefficient is positive and marginally statistically significant. The UN’s goal, including 
its agencies in monitoring sanitation facilities is to ensure adequate provision in every nation. All other 
variables’ behaviour is as discussed under the revenue share in terms of improved access to sanitation 
facilities.  
Table 3 displays results for the effect of decentralisation as measured by revenue share and expenditure 
share on improved access to water sources. The results in columns 1 to 3 of Table 3 report the effect of 
decentralisation as measured by revenue share on improved access to water sources. The results in 
columns 4 to 6 report the effect of decentralisation as measured by expenditure share on improved access 
to water provision. The result in column 2, Table 3 suggests that decentralisation, as measured by revenue 
share, does have a positive impact on improved access to water sources. The coefficient of the Lag revenue 
share is positive and statistically significant under FE. The result suggests that a 1 percentage point rise in 
decentralisation as measured by the proportion of revenues of subnational governments in total government 
revenues leads to an increase of 0.16 percentage points in improved access to water sources. It is 
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noteworthy that this effect is larger than the effect of decentralisation on improved access to sanitation 
facilities. 
 
Table 2: Effect of decentralisation on improved access to sanitation facilities for all countries 
Variable 
Revenue share Expenditure share 
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
Lag revenue share -0.2811*** 0.1165*** 0.1064***    
 (0.0955) (0.0343) (0.0344)    
Lag expenditure share    -0.2947*** 0.1065*** 0.0854** 
    (0.0986) (0.0372) (0.0379) 
Government size 0.5041** 0.2794*** 0.3550*** 0.5085** 0.2874*** 0.3616*** 
 (0.1916) (0.0976) (0.0878) (0.1953) (0.0948) (0.0852) 
Log GDP per capita 8.8940*** 9.6252*** 8.5487*** 9.2678*** 9.0562*** 8.0791*** 
 (2.5898) (2.3844) (2.1650) (2.6090) (2.3666) (2.1597) 
Log pop. density 0.5690 16.1601*** 6.7156*** 0.4956 16.1943*** 6.5620*** 
 (1.1046) (4.8360) (2.0562) (1.1228) (4.9022) (2.0654) 
Bureaucratic quality -1.6818 0.3367 0.3069 -1.6897 0.4255 0.3589 
 (2.2996) (0.5455) (0.6373) (2.2279) (0.5638) (0.6772) 
Democratic acct. -2.1443** 0.9047*** 0.8625*** -2.2376** 0.9923*** 0.9398*** 
 (1.0061) (0.2611) (0.3044) (1.0061) (0.2621) (0.3063) 
Globalisation 0.2815 0.0978 0.0953 0.2748 0.1143* 0.1101* 
 (0.1798) (0.0630) (0.0626) (0.1794) (0.0636) (0.0630) 
Political competition -6.8941 -2.8950 -2.6578 -5.7634 -2.3775 -2.3197 
 (6.0480) (2.8079) (2.9443) (5.5173) (2.4787) (2.6278) 
Internal conflict 1.9545*** -0.0663 0.0704 2.0472*** -0.0897 0.0595 
 (0.6704) (0.1417) (0.1462) (0.6808) (0.1484) (0.1514) 
Competition*revshare 0.4691** -0.0032 -0.0226    
 (0.2042) (0.1440) (0.1395)    
Competition*expshare    0.4787** -0.0560 -0.0668 
    (0.2028) (0.1546) (0.1516) 
Observation 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,023 1,023 1,023 
R2 0.72 0.68 0.41 0.72 0.67 0.41 
RMSE 8.93 1.39 1.54 8.90 1.41 1.56 
Rho  1.00 0.98  1.00 0.98 
F Test 8.70*** 8.56***  9.22*** 8.75***  
Wald (Chi2)   198.44***   196.87*** 
Hausman Test  83.40***   83.56***  
BP LM Test   6167.78***   6200.32*** 
Significance levels: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Clustered robust standard errors at the country level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the improved access 
to sanitation. Results in columns 1 to 3 are based on a year lag of revenue share as a measure of decentralisation. In contrast, results in columns 4 to 6 are 
based on a year lag of expenditure share as a measure of decentralisation. Revenue share is the ratio of revenues of subnational governments to total government 
revenues, while expenditure share is the ratio of expenditures of subnational governments to total government expenditures. All measures are indicated above 
the estimators. Log pop. density refers to log population density. Democratic acct. means democratic accountability. The interaction terms are political competition 
multiplied by revenue share and expenditure share, respectively. RMSE means root mean square error, while BP LM test implies Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier test. F test indicates the model’s overall significance with the null hypothesis that a model with no independent variable fits the data better. Wald (Chi2) 
is also a test of overall significance applied to the RE model with a null hypothesis that the regressors are zero. The year effects are dummies included in all the 
estimators to capture the variation over the years. The year fixed effects are not statistically significant under OLS estimator in columns 1 and 4 using the 







Table 3: Effect of decentralisation on improved access to water sources for all countries 
Variable 
Revenue share Expenditure share 
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
Lag revenue share -0.0112 0.1561*** 0.1301***    
 (0.0318) (0.0524) (0.0463)    
Lag expenditure share    -0.0138 0.1280** 0.0905* 
    (0.0313) (0.0508) (0.0475) 
Government size 0.2986*** 0.1183 0.1078 0.2946*** 0.1212 0.1126 
 (0.0925) (0.0890) (0.1126) (0.0917) (0.0912) (0.1173) 
Log GDP per capita 3.5453*** 6.7027*** 3.5404*** 3.4943*** 6.3386*** 3.2962** 
 (0.8950) (2.2265) (1.3555) (0.8786) (2.2707) (1.4074) 
Log pop. density 0.8855 7.3447 1.8011** 0.8821 7.9109 1.7319* 
 (0.6001) (5.5104) (0.8655) (0.6019) (5.6698) (0.8903) 
Bureaucratic quality -0.7262 0.0193 -0.2177 -0.7187 0.1153 -0.1737 
 (0.7909) (0.3837) (0.4361) (0.7892) (0.4713) (0.5227) 
Democratic acct. -0.5196 0.8114*** 0.7402** -0.4823 0.9184*** 0.8243*** 
 (0.4017) (0.2805) (0.2954) (0.4034) (0.2919) (0.3087) 
Globalisation 0.0749 0.1417** 0.1487** 0.0801 0.1603** 0.1627** 
 (0.0720) (0.0697) (0.0701) (0.0723) (0.0755) (0.0753) 
Political competition -6.2556** -1.1776 -0.5455 -6.1638** -1.4201 -1.0856 
 (3.0337) (1.9940) (2.0700) (2.7997) (1.8251) (1.9655) 
Internal conflict 0.4437 -0.3026* -0.1879 0.4411 -0.3257* -0.1899 
 (0.3704) (0.1754) (0.2011) (0.3759) (0.1882) (0.2121) 
Competition*revshare 0.2094** 0.0195 -0.0320    
 (0.1003) (0.1096) (0.0934)    
Competition*expshare    0.2360** 0.0216 -0.0156 
    (0.1009) (0.1166) (0.1035) 
Observation 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,034 1,034 1,034 
R2 0.67 0.61 0.49 0.67 0.59 0.50 
RMSE 4.09 1.31 1.45 4.09 1.35 1.49 
Rho  0.99 0.89  0.99 0.89 
F Test 10.16*** 8.96***  10.20*** 8.13***  
Wald (Chi2)   353.43***   301.51*** 
Hausman Test  50.54***   44.27***  
BP LM Test   2964.34***   2943.75*** 
Significance levels: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Clustered robust standard errors at the country level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the improved access 
to water. Results in columns 1 to 3 are based on a year lag of revenue share as a measure of decentralisation. In contrast, results in columns 4 to 6 are based 
on a year lag of expenditure share as a measure of decentralisation. Revenue share is the ratio of revenues of subnational governments to total government 
revenues, while expenditure share is the ratio of expenditures of subnational governments to total government expenditures. All measures are indicated above 
the estimators. Log pop. density refers to log population density. Democratic acct. means democratic accountability. The interaction terms are political competition 
multiplied by revenue share and expenditure share, respectively. RMSE means root mean square error, while BP LM test implies Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier test. F test indicates the model’s overall significance with the null hypothesis that a model with no independent variable fits the data better. Wald (Chi2) 
is also a test of overall significance applied to the RE model with a null hypothesis that the regressors are zero. The year effects are dummies included in all the 
estimators to capture the variation over the years. The year fixed effects are not statistically significant under OLS estimator in column 4 using the postestimation 
command of testparm (StataCorp, 2017). The number of countries included in the models is 67. Source: Author’s computation. 
 
The effect of Government size on improved access to water sources is not statistically significant under the 
FE in column 2 of Table 3, unlike under the effect of decentralisation as measured by revenue share on 
improved access to sanitation facilities. Log GDP per capita is positive and significantly correlated with 
improved access to water sources. A 1 percentage increase in income level per capita leads to a rise of 
0.07 percentage points in improved access to water provision. The level of wealth of a nation is a significant 
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determinant of improved access to water sources. The sign of the associated coefficients with both Log 
population density and Bureaucratic quality is positive, but the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
However, Democratic accountability is positive and statistically significant. The responsiveness of 
government is relevant to improved access to water provision. The coefficient of globalisation is positive and 
statistically significant, which implies improved access to water sources responds to globalisation. This can 
be linked with the universal declaration of targets for the MDGs by the UN. The coefficient of Political 
competition is negative, but it is not statistically significant. The coefficient of internal conflict is negative 
and statistically significant, as expected. In the absence of peace, there can be no progress. This extends 
to the provision of basic services for human existence, such as water.  
The focus is on the impact of decentralisation as measured by expenditure share on improved access to 
water sources. The result in column 5, Table 3 points at a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between decentralisation as measured by expenditure share and improved access to water sources. The 
result of the Lag expenditure share under the FE suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in 
decentralisation as measured by the proportion of expenditures of subnational governments in total 
government expenditures leads to a rise of 0.13 percentage points in improved access to water. The 
behaviour of the variables under the expenditure share is similar to the variables’ behaviour under the 
revenue share for improved access to water sources. The variables behave the same way under both revenue 










9 For FE models reported in Tables 2 and 3, the interaction terms were removed to see the effect on Political competition and other coefficients in the models. 
The variable Political competition is negative and statistically significant for the effect of decentralisation on improved access to sanitation facilities under both 
revenue share and expenditure share. On the other hand, there is no significant change in the magnitude of the other covariates. But for the effect of 
decentralisation on improved access to water under both revenue share and expenditure share, Political competition is negative, but it is not statistically significant 
as expected. These results are not reported here.  
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Table 4: Effect of decentralisation on improved access to sanitation facilities in rural and urban areas 
Variable 
Rural Urban 
Revshare Expshare Revshare Expshare 
Lag revenue share 0.1368***  0.0655***  
 (0.0506)  (0.0241)  
Lag expenditure share  0.1487**  0.0531** 
  (0.0655)  (0.0245) 
Government size 0.4668*** 0.4857*** 0.1234** 0.1285** 
 (0.1510) (0.1489) (0.0577) (0.0563) 
Log GDP per capita 13.0003*** 12.6659*** 4.7688*** 4.5310*** 
 (3.4508) (3.4768) (1.3997) (1.3942) 
Log population density 18.9579** 19.2133** 9.5482*** 9.6384*** 
 (7.6078) (7.5705) (2.8008) (2.9234) 
Bureaucratic quality 1.0413 1.2050 0.6483* 0.7003* 
 (1.1045) (1.1324) (0.3751) (0.4094) 
Democratic accountability 1.2457*** 1.3377*** 0.4752*** 0.5266*** 
 (0.4168) (0.4160) (0.1495) (0.1505) 
Globalisation 0.1846* 0.2012* 0.0335 0.0417 
 (0.1044) (0.1040) (0.0315) (0.0321) 
Political competition -2.0383 -1.7431 -0.1050 -0.0977 
 (3.1211) (2.6303) (1.5175) (1.3570) 
Internal conflict -0.1874 -0.2300 -0.0144 -0.0235 
 (0.2351) (0.2385) (0.0875) (0.0922) 
Competition*revshare -0.0242  -0.0448  
 (0.1969)  (0.0877)  
Competition*expshare  -0.0604  -0.0631 
  (0.1991)  (0.0969) 
Observation 1,022 1,023 1,023 1,024 
R2 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 
RMSE 2.32 2.32 0.79 0.80 
Rho 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 
F Test 15.79 23.81 5.49 4.99 
Hausman Test 61.60*** 62.11*** 61.53*** 60.89*** 
Significance levels: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Clustered robust standard errors at the country level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the improved access 
to sanitation facilities. Results in columns 1 and 2 under Rural are estimated using the proportion of the rural population with improved access to sanitation. In 
contrast, the results under Urban in columns 3 and 4 are estimated using the proportion of the urban population with improved access to sanitation. Revshare 
means revenue share as a measure of decentralisation, the ratio of revenues of subnational governments to total government revenues; while Expshare refers to 
expenditure share as a measure of decentralisation, the ratio of expenditures of subnational governments to total government expenditures. All measures of 
decentralisation are lagged by one year in the reported estimates. The reported results are estimated using fixed effects (FE) estimator. The interaction terms are 
political competition multiplied by revenue share and expenditure share, respectively. RMSE means root mean square error. F test indicates the model’s overall 
significance with the null hypothesis that a model with no independent variable fits the data better. The number of countries included in the reported results is 
66. The year effects are dummies included in all the estimators to capture the variation over the years. The year fixed effects are statistically significant for all 










Table 5: Effect of decentralisation on improved access to water sources in rural and urban areas 
Variable 
Rural Urban 
Revshare Expshare Revshare Expshare 
Lag revenue share 0.2714***  0.0340  
 (0.0840)  (0.0213)  
Lag expenditure share  0.2524***  0.0222 
  (0.0943)  (0.0218) 
Government size 0.1851 0.1979 0.0105 0.0157 
 (0.1760) (0.1771) (0.0333) (0.0338) 
Log GDP per capita 10.1179*** 10.0165*** 1.9142** 1.8090* 
 (3.1489) (3.2383) (0.9211) (0.9188) 
Log population density 7.8083 9.5026 3.4267 3.3857 
 (9.7161) (9.8787) (2.1877) (2.2380) 
Bureaucratic quality 1.4120 1.6869 0.0354 0.0584 
 (1.0001) (1.1109) (0.1810) (0.1953) 
Democratic accountability 1.4902*** 1.6621*** 0.1880 0.2201 
 (0.4333) (0.4506) (0.1391) (0.1404) 
Globalisation 0.2598** 0.2857** 0.0254 0.0300 
 (0.1284) (0.1382) (0.0214) (0.0224) 
Political competition 0.3202 -0.7117 0.2912 0.1492 
 (2.9989) (2.2754) (0.7104) (0.6598) 
Internal conflict -0.5105* -0.5710* -0.1396** -0.1417** 
 (0.2923) (0.3157) (0.0650) (0.0685) 
Competition*revshare 0.0148  -0.0396  
 (0.1782)  (0.0393)  
Competition*expshare  0.0690  -0.0415 
  (0.1687)  (0.0467) 
Observation 1,033 1,034 1,035 1,036 
R2 0.57 0.56 0.40 0.39 
RMSE 2.57 2.61 0.54 0.54 
Rho 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 
F Test 8.81 12.53 3.08 3.55 
Hausman Test 72.44*** 65.98*** 10.95 11.86 
Significance levels: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. Clustered robust standard errors at the country level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the improved access 
to water sources. Results in columns 1 and 2 under Rural are estimated using the proportion of the rural population with improved access to water. In contrast, 
the results under Urban in columns 3 and 4 are estimated using the proportions of the urban population with improved access to water. Revshare means revenue 
share as a measure of decentralisation, the ratio of revenues of subnational governments to total government revenues; while Expshare refers to expenditure 
share as a measure of decentralisation, the ratio of expenditures of subnational governments to total government expenditures. All measures of decentralisation 
are lagged by one year in the reported estimates. The reported results are estimated using fixed effects (FE) estimator. The interaction terms are political 
competition multiplied by revenue share and expenditure share, respectively. RMSE means root mean square error. F test indicates the model’s overall significance 
with the null hypothesis that a model with no independent variable fits the data better. The number of countries included in the reported results is 67. The year 
effects are dummies included in all the estimators to capture the variation over the years. The year fixed effects are statistically significant for all reported results 
under FE using the postestimation command of testparm (StataCorp, 2017) except in column 3. For results in columns 3 and 4, the Hausman test is not 






4.2 Robustness checks 
The robustness checks are conducted to confirm the consistency of the econometric estimates of this study. 
The dependent variable data, improved access to sanitation and water services measured in percentage of 
the total population with improved access, is the aggregated data for both urban and rural areas at the 
country level. The disaggregated data is available for rural and urban areas in every country assessed by 
the UN’s agencies saddled with the data collection on improved access to sanitation facilities and water 
sources. The goal of decentralisation is to accelerate development, tailor public outputs towards local needs, 
and bring governance closer to the governed (Oates, 1972,1999). Oates (2002) and Dinan et al. (1999) 
have maintained that there are welfare losses in the uniform standard’s imposition in water provision. This 
arises from the influence of environmental factors on water quality. Considering this view, it is appropriate 
to use the disaggregated data, for both rural and urban areas, on improved access to sanitation facilities 
and water sources measured in percentage of the rural and urban population with improved access to check 
the robustness of our econometric estimates. 
The robustness check is conducted to check if decentralisation impacts improved access to sanitation and 
water services in rural areas vis-à-vis the country level and urban areas. Decentralisation is expected to bring 
governance closer to the governed with improvement in public services. In many countries, the presence of 
government is hardly felt at the subnational level, especially in rural areas, as many rural areas are without 
basic amenities (Zewari et al., 2011). The results from the robustness checks where the dependent variable 
is improved access to sanitation facilities and water sources measured in the percentage of the rural 
population with improved access are similar to results for the main regression estimates in Tables 2 and 3. 
The results for the robustness checks are shown in Tables 4 and 5. As in the main regressions, the focus 
is on the FE estimator’s results because it is the most efficient among the estimators explored in the main 
regressions. The results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that decentralisation, as measured by revenue share and 
expenditure share, has a positive impact on improved access to sanitation and water services in rural areas. 
Both Lag revenue share and Lag expenditure share are positive and statistically significant. The positive 
effects of decentralisation on improved access to sanitation facilities and improved access to water sources 
are larger for the rural areas vis-à-vis the country level and urban areas. The results represent an ideal 
decentralisation system where resources are devolved to subnational governments in terms of subnational 
revenue share and expenditure share in total government revenues and expenditures. This presupposes that 
the subnational government can take fiscal decisions without interference from the central government.   
The results support the decentralisation of governance architecture in meeting the demands for the provision 
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of essential services such as water and sanitation services at subnational levels. When the government is 
moved closer to the people, there is a likelihood of improvement in public services outputs. The econometric 
estimation results indicate that the behaviour of the variables is similar in magnitude and direction as in the 
main regression estimates. Still, the coefficients of decentralisation are larger for rural areas. In all, the 
results of robustness checks suggest decentralisation correlates positively with improved access to sanitation 
facilities and water sources. However, political competition is not statistically significant under the FE 
estimator across measures of decentralisation. The interaction term’s effect is also not distinguishable 
across measures of decentralisation for the FE estimates for main regressions and robustness checks. Even 
so, attempts are made to distinguish the effect through margin plots, but the results remain the same.10 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of decentralisation on improved access to sanitation facilities and water 
sources. The decentralised governance architecture promises an efficient delivery of public goods where it 
engenders healthy competition among various government levels, particularly at the horizontal level. The 
primary goal of decentralisation is to bring governance close to the governed. Given this fact, governments 
at the local level may be better positioned to make services delivery to the people (Oates 1972, 1999). 
Decentralisation may be better in addressing unavailability and unimproved drinking water and poor 
sanitation at the subnational level in many countries. The decentralised governance mechanism takes into 
consideration the heterogeneity of interests in any geopolitical setting. This system encourages bottom-up 
approaches in addressing developmental challenges by giving recognition to the regional and environmental 
realities. More so, the effects of environmental conditions on the quality of drinking water and sewerage 
management suggest decentralisation may help resolve the challenges hindering the provision of these 
services. This approach will ensure that services suit the circumstances of each jurisdiction. This is in line 
with the views expressed by Oates (2002) and Dinan et al. (1999). 
Decentralisation increases governance quality (Kyriacon & Rosa-Segalés, 2011) and trust in government 
(Lightart & Oudheusden, 2015) because local people are saddled with their jurisdictional governance. Under 
a decentralised governance arrangement, various jurisdictions will strive to improve drinking water and 
sanitation services, given the knock-on effects of these essential services. In terms of the fiscal capacity and 
 
10 Theoretically, the regression estimates are adequate to identify the effects of interaction terms in linear models. But we choose to go the extra mile to identify 
the effects of the interaction terms in our models through margin plots. The information provided by the margin plots is not different from the estimates of our 
regressions concerning either the effect of revenue/expenditure share on the two states of competition or the effect of competition for different values of  
revenue/expenditure share. The margin plots are not shown here. 
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autonomy of subnational governments, the degree of decentralisation is important for the provision of 
services. The more the proportion of the fiscal resources at the subnational levels, the higher is the capacity 
to provide essential services to meet local demands. The results from this study strengthen the support for 
a system of decentralisation in governance. Besides, institutional factors matter for improved access to 
water and sanitation services. An accountable government will work hard to improve access to sanitation 
facilities and water sources. In the absence of peace, no development can take place. Nations that are 
experiencing civil strife cannot meet the needs of the populations. Conflicts make it impossible to improve 
access to sanitation and water services. Globalisation is also a significant driver of improved access to 
sanitation and water provision. This may have been driven by the United Nations’ declaration and campaign 
to eliminate poor access to sanitation facilities and improved water sources worldwide, especially in 
developing countries.  
However, decentralisation in many developing countries is bedevilled with many challenges, including 
corruption and local capture (Prud’homme, 1995; Reinikka & Svensson, 2004). The grants to subnational 
levels from the central government are sometimes cornered for the elites’ selfish gains at the local level. 
Furthermore, decentralisation is most times lopsided in developing countries (Prud’homme, 1995). 
Revenues tend to be shared, favouring the central government, while expenditures tend to be decentralised 
at the lower level. This may have significant negative effects on the provision of services. As Ahmad et al. 
(2006) suggested, various instruments of decentralisation facing service providers at the local level may 
alter their incentives for the provision of services. Notwithstanding the challenges of decentralisation, it 
appears a better governance architecture to improve services at the local level. The effect of decentralisation 
on improved access to water and sanitation services is larger in the rural areas vis-à-vis the country level 
and urban areas. By and large, our results suggest that decentralisation improve access to sanitation 
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Table A: Definitions and sources of data 
Variable Description Sources 
Improved sanitation Improved sanitation facilities (% of 
population with access) 
United Nations (UN) accessed 
through World Bank 
Development Indicators (WDI), 
2016  
Improved water Improved water sources (% of 
population with access) 




Subnational government share of 
revenues (as % of total government 
revenues) 
Government Finance Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund 




Subnational government share of 
expenditures (as % of total government 
expenditure) 
GFS, IMF, 2016 and author’s 
computation 
Government size The ratio of general government final 
consumption expenditures (constant 
2010 US$) to gross domestic product 
(GDP) multiply by 100 
WDI, 2016 and author’s 
computation 
Log GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita (constant 2010 
US$) 
WDI, 2016 
Log population density Log of the ratio of total population to 
the land area of a country in square 
kilometre. 
WDI, 2016 
Bureaucratic quality Indicator of stability and bureaucratic 
quality denoting the risk of policy 
reversal. Very high quality = 4, very low 
quality = 0. 
International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), 2018 
Democratic accountability Measure of responsiveness of the 
government to its people based on the 
prevailing democratic practice. Lowest 
risk = 6, highest risk = 1. 
ICRG, 2018 
Globalisation 2017 KOF (The Swiss Economic 
Institute) index of globalisation 
Dreher (2006) 
Internal conflict Assessment of countries’ internal risk of 
political violence effect on governance. 
Very high risk = 0, very low risk = 4.  
ICRG, 2018 
Political competition Polity2 score normalised to a dummy 
variable where it takes 0 for Politity2 
score between -10 to 0 and 1 for 1 to 
10 (Aidt & Eterovic, 2011). 
Polity IV: Regime authority 
characteristics and transitions 
datasets, Centre for Systemic 
Peace, 2015 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
